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Abstract—A smart grid connects several agents
who may be electricity consumers/producers, such
as wind/solar/storage farms, fossil-fuel plants,
industrial/commercial loads, or load-serving aggregators,
all modeled as stochastic dynamical systems. In each time
period, each consumes/supplies some electrical energy.
Each agent’s utility is either the benefit accrued from its
consumption, or the negative of its generation cost. There
may also be externalities modeled as negative utilities.
The sum of all these utilities, called the social welfare, is
the total benefit accrued from all consumption minus the
total cost of generation and externalities. The Independent
System Operator is charged with maximizing the social
welfare subject to total generation equalling consumption
in each time period, but without the agents revealing
their system states, dynamic models or utility functions.
It has to announce prices after interacting with agents
via bid-price interactions where agents respond with their
optimal generation/consumption.
If agents observe and know the laws of uncertainties
affecting other agents, then there is an iterative price-bid
interaction that leads to the global maximum value of social
welfare attainable if agents had pooled their information.
In the important case where agents are LQG systems,
the bid-price iteration is dramatically simple and tractable,
exchanging only time-vectors of future prices and con-
sumptions/generations at each time step. Agents need not
know of the existence of other agents. State-dependent bid-
ding/pricing is not needed. If the DC Power Flow Equations
are incorporated it yields the optimal stochastic dynamic
locational marginal prices.
Thereby a solution is proposed for a potentially econom-
ically important decentralized stochastic control problem.
The results may be of broader interest in general equilibrium
theory of economics for stochastic dynamic agents.
Index Terms—Decentralized Stochastic Control, Social
Welfare, General Equilibrium Theory, Demand Response,
Renewable Energy, Power Systems, Independent System
Operator, Energy Market.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN the electricity grid, the power generated should beequal to the power consumed at all times, neglecting
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line losses. Unlike other commodities, electricity cannot
be stored in the grid. The task of ensuring that generation
is balanced with consumption, and in the most economi-
cal way, is entrusted to the Independent System Operator
(ISO) in deregulated electricity markets [1].
In the era with fossil fuel as the dominant source of
electricity it was possible to adjust generation to meet
demand. In the future, as more energy from uncertain and
dynamically varying renewables such as wind or solar is
used, it is demand that may need to be adjusted continu-
ally to balance generation. This strategy is called “demand
response.” An example of an adjustable load is an inertial
thermal load such as a home with an air conditioner
that can be turned off for a while, while still maintaining
comfort within the stipulated band of temperatures. New
business models are emerging for intermediaries such as
retail power service providers, also called “aggregators”
or “load-serving entities,” to sign up a large collection
of such customers and undertake their demand response
opportunistically, in response to shortages or excess of
renewable power that reflect themselves in higher or
lower prices, respectively. Large commercial enterprises
and industrial loads also will similarly adjust and optimize
their energy usage and cost in-house. Therefore both
demand and supply will generally be dynamic and uncer-
tain due to external factors such as uncertain supply and
ambient temperature interacting with load requirements.
The problem we address is how the ISO can perform
its task in the new scenario where loads and generators
are stochastic dynamic systems. The primary mechanism
for coordinating all entities is by time-varying stochastic
prices. However, being stochastic dynamic systems, enti-
ties will need to know the probability distribution of fu-
ture prices to plan their optimal consumption/generation
over time. But future prices depend on all future uncer-
tainties affecting any of the entity. Uncertainty in wind in
a certain locale may affect a wind farm, cloud cover may
affect a solar farm, a broken turbine blade may affect a
gas turbine, low customer traffic may affect a commercial
entity, or high ambient temperature may affect a group
of homes, and each of them may globally impact prices
everywhere at all future times. However, an entity is
generally unaware of uncertainties affecting other entities
or how they will respond. So how can they optimally
plan their generation/consumption in the face of dynamic
uncertainty and lack of knowledge of each other?
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2The role played by price in coordinating agents has
been explored in general equilibrium theory, initiated
by Walras [2]. In their breakthrough work, Arrow and
Debreu [3]–[5] showed that a correct choice of prices for
commodities ensures, under a quasi-concavity assumption
on utility functions, that a system of individual entities,
where each optimizes its own response given prices,
results in a systemwide Pareto optimal solution where no
entity can benefit without another losing. Subsequently,
Arrow, Block and Hurwicz [6] showed that the prices
can be discovered by Walrasian tatonnement [2] under
appropriate conditions such as gross substitutes. Their
theory extends to allow for uncertainty by simply con-
sidering each good under a different random state of
nature as a different good, as shown by Arrow [7].
Subsequently, Radner [8] has shown the existence of
prices corresponding to an equilibrium even if different
agents have different random observations.
The idea of employing prices to perform this task in
the electrical power domain was introduced in semi-
nal papers by Caramanis, Bohn and Schweppe [9] and
Bohn, Caramanis and Schweppe [10]. Hogan [11] further
elaborated the detailed implementation of a locational
marginal price-based electricity market operation.
Fundamentally based on a static dispatch with no
uncertainty, today’s electricity market design and corre-
sponding price signal are simply not designed for achiev-
ing social welfare optimality for dynamic generators and
loads. The current market mechanism requires partici-
pants to make decoupled bids for separate time inter-
vals. In the day-ahead market, a generator has to bid
a price-generation curve for the 8am-9am slot, another
separate curve for the 9am-10am slot, and so on, for
each hour of the next day. However, generators have
ramping constraints, such as 50 MW/hour, which give
rise to inter-temporal constraints between different time
slots. These are typically handled by ad hoc out-of-market
(OOM) merit order measures [12].The bidding procedure
fundamentally does not allow a generator to bid a time
function even though that is critical to its operation.
Similarly, in the real-time market, the bidding process
does not allow a participant to optimize with respect to
stochastic process models of uncertain resources such as
wind. There have been many studies on the potential
problems associated with this market design, such as
unnecessarily price volatility [13], network externalities
[14], and lack of investment signals [15]. While in con-
ventional systems the deterministic and static approach
to approximating the underlying dynamic and stochas-
tic power system may be practically appealing without
much loss of optimality, emerging resources such as de-
mand response and intermittent renewables render such
approximation invalid [16]. No previous work achieves
social optimality of the entire collection of all stochastic
dynamic systems. Providing a theoretical foundation for
achieving this fundamental goal is the target of this paper.
We address the ISO problem where each agent is an
individual stochastic dynamic agent whose very nature –
its dynamic model, uncertainties affecting it, and its utility
function – are not necessarily disclosed to others. Our goal
is to attain a global maximum of the social welfare.
The key issue here is not existence of a solution, since
here that is simply the maximizer of social welfare, but
how to arrive at it, and realize it, in a distributed way.
There are several interesting aspects to the problem
faced by the ISO. We seek a global optimum of the
total social welfare, not just an equilibrium. To see the
difference, one can consider the work of Radner [8] that
is closest to ours in its allowance of different observations
for different agents. In that theory, the actions of agents
are constant over their information – if an agent does not
know the states of other agents, then its action does not
change unless its own observed state changes. However,
a globally optimal solution will require coordination of
the actions of all entities so as to be responsive to
each others’ states. Thus, the price stochastic process will
need to provide this additional coordinating information.
The issue examined in this paper is how the ISO is to
determine prices and ensure such coordination.
Importantly, we will fundamentally exploit the very
fact that uncertain events unfold over time in a dynamic
system, to design dynamic interactive strategies for coor-
dination. This is in contrast to Arrow’s approach [7] where
the problem with uncertainty is reduced to a problem
without uncertainty when the descriptions of the uncer-
tainty states of all the agents and their utility functions
are known a priori. The equilibrium prices corresponding
to each uncertainty state can then be computed at the
very outset itself. Such an approach therefore considers
the problem in “normal” form, where the entire dynamic
system is simply formulated as a “static” system where
each agent chooses its strategy as a function of prices at
states. This observation is also made by Smale [17].
The problem is also interesting from the viewpoint
of decentralized stochastic control. Since we seek to
maximize social welfare, it is a problem in team theory.
However, since Witsenhausen [18] it is known that if
agents are unaware of each other’s actions but influence
each other’s observations, then the problem is generally
intractable, even in linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) sys-
tems. Unawareness of other’s actions is the norm in any
distributed stochastic system such as the ISO problem.
Nevertheless, in the ISO problem, we show that a sys-
tem consisting of a collection of LQG systems has an
elegant and tractable solution. The tatonnement process
for obtaining the global optimum is remarkably simple,
even if all entities have private uncertainties. There is no
need for agents to even share models of their systems,
their uncertainties, the probability distributions of their
uncertainties, or their utility functions. Thus, the ISO can
optimally coordinate a set of distributed LQG systems very
simply without knowing any of their details. This is po-
tentially important, since LQG models are widely used in
power systems, where systems are often approximable as
linear systems, noises as Gaussian, and costs as quadratic
in states and actions.
3Importantly, the above approach extends to any number
of linear constraints, besides balancing generation and
consumption. An important task of the ISO problem is to
ensure delivery of required power flows over a congested
transmission network. A commonly used of model the
transmission network, is through (somewhat misleadingly
labeled) “DC power flow” equations, where differences in
bus phase angles determine the power flows along the
lines [19]. Their popularity derives from the fact that
the resulting equations are linear. Hence the LQG model
extends to include the transmission network and provides
a very simple solution for the ISO to obtain dynamic
stochastic dynamic locational marginal prices that attain
the global maximum of the social welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II surveys
related work. Section III describes the broad context,
Section IV the system of agents, formulates the ISO
problem, and describes the fundamental challenges. We
then progressively build up to more complex systems. Be-
ginning with static deterministic systems in Section V, we
show how the ISO can determine both the optimal price
and optimal allocations of consumptions/generations to
agents through a bid-price process that corresponds to
a subgradient iteration with subsequent averaging. Then
we consider deterministic dynamic systems in Section VI
and show how prices and allocations as a function of time
can be determined through the same bid-price iteration.
Section VII describes iterative bid-price schemes used
subsequently in the stochastic dynamic context. Then we
turn to the stochastic problem in Section VIII where all
agents are subject to a common uncertainty and show
that by viewing the system as a “tree” the results can be
extended from the deterministic case. We next show in
Section IX that this approach can be extended to systems
where entities have private uncertainties, by viewing the
system in extended form, and iterating at each time
between the ISO and the agents for price and allocation
discovery. Knowledge by the agents of the probability laws
of each other’s uncertainties is required, though not of
their dynamic models, utilities, or the semantics of the
uncertainties since labels of uncertainties can be non-
informatively chosen. The difficult issue is complexity,
caused by the exponentially exploding joint state space
of the uncertainties. However, in Section X, we show that
the complexity disappears for distributed LQG systems,
leading to a simple and implementable solution. The
ISO simply discovers and announces time-varying but not
state-dependent prices for future epochs, and revises them
at each time step, reminiscent of model predictive control.
We show in Section XI that this result can be extended to
include any linear constraints, e.g., the widely used DC-
power flow equations. Section XII presents the results of
illustrative simulations, concluding in Section XIII.
II. RELATED WORKS
No similar results appear to be known for general de-
centralized stochastic control. Team problems have been
extensively studied, e.g., [20]–[22], but those formu-
lations do not apply here since agents need to know
the system dynamics of other agents. Even when the
models are known, there are still considerable difficulties
in decentralized stochastic control. When agents do not
share observations, severe complexity arises, even in LQG
systems, as shown by Witsenhausen’s counterexample
of a two stage problem [18]. The roles of observation,
signaling [21], and the trade-off between communica-
tion and control are evident from Witsenhausen’s coun-
terexample [18]. Teneketzis [23] considers decentralized
stochastic control under the restrictive assumption that
the interaction between agents is “weak”. There are some
recent structural results [24], and results regarding suffi-
cient statistics [25] under these assumptions.
From the economics side, this work is an extension of
general equilibrium theory [26]. To the authors’ knowl-
edge there does not appear to be any similar result for
coordinating multiple LQG systems or the efficiency of
the simplified signaling. While the name may appear to
be related to the issues studies here, Dynamic General
Stochastic Equilibrium theory pioneered in [27] addresses
issues in macroeconomics, and is not relevant for the
problems of interest here.
Viewed from the power system end, there have been
many efforts since the deregulation of the electricity
sector on a market-based framework to clear the system.
Today’s locational marginal price-based nodal market de-
sign is based on seminal work in [10], [11]. This has
been followed up by a large body of literature focusing on
designing an efficient transmission pricing mechanism in
support of an efficient market [28] [29]. From the system
operators’ perspective, the naive belief that deregulation
of electricity industry would simply work was critically
re-assessed following the Enron crisis and lack of long-
term investment [30] [31]. From a market participant’s
perspective, there has been pioneering work on game
theoretic approaches to modeling the market power issues
in the electricity market [32] [33]. With increasing pen-
etration of stochastic resources, there have been efforts
at designing a market bidding mechanism that achieves
the social welfare optimum. Ilic et al. [34] have pro-
posed a two-layered approach that internalizes individual
constraints of market participants while allowing the ISO
to manage the spatial complexity. References [35], [36]
contain some heuristic approaches. Reference [37] applies
progressive hedging to deal with uncertainties on the
production side; however the solution is centralized, and
does not provide any theoretical guarantees. Reference
[38] studies how the ISO should dispatch, i.e., purchase
energy and call options in different markets, under fore-
cast errors about future loads and renewable generation,
when future decisions can mitigate current errors.
However, there has been no analytical framework that
precisely leads to the social welfare optimality with dy-
namic, stochastic inputs from market participants. The
major challenge addressed is how to elicit optimal de-
mand response in such cases without generators/loads
4revealing the details of their dynamic models to the ISO.
III. THE ISO PROBLEM OF COORDINATING DYNAMICAL
AND UNCERTAIN GENERATORS, LOADS AND PROSUMERS
Generators such as wind farms, photo-voltaic farms, hy-
dro, coal or gas turbines, need to be modeled as dynamic
stochastic systems. Likewise, loads such as aggregators,
commercial or industrial establishments, also need to be
so modeled since their demand may be governed by a dy-
namic system, and random. Since environmental variables
such as temperature are involved, and since human beings
in the loop respond to economic incentives/prices, their
response may also be uncertain. Hence loads generally
will also need to modeled as stochastic dynamic systems.
Storage services such as battery farms or pumped hydro
can also be modeled as dynamic systems where the state is
the amount of energy stored. Dynamic models can also be
used to model “prosumers” such as homes with solar pan-
els, which can switch between consumption/generation.
The utility of a generator is the negative of its cost of
generation. The utility of a load is the “benefit” that the
load accrues from the consumed power. There may also
be externalities, such as pollution, that can optionally be
modeled as a cost, i.e., negative utility. The total of all
the utilities, called social welfare, is therefore the benefit
of the power consumed minus the cost of generating it
and the cost of externalities, and the goal is to operate
the overall system so as to maximize it.
An agent’s utility is measured not statically, but over
a time interval of interest, since agents are dynamic
systems. A large commercial load may accrue utility over
a period of time, by maintaining the temperature within
a band by switching air conditioners off and on taking
time lags into account, if demand response strategies are
in place. Similarly, a storage service may buy and store
energy at off-peak times and sell it at peak times, again
accruing value only over a time interval. Generators too
may accrue utility over time by ramping up generation.
An agent’s utility is affected by stochastic uncertainties
of other agents, since coal shortage at a generator may
affect a distant load. Each agent seeks to maximize the ex-
pected value of its own utility function, with expectation
taken over all uncertainties affecting all agents.
There are important and severe constraints on the
information disclosed to the ISO. It does not know the
states, dynamic models, or utility functions of individual
agents. Whether loads or generators, individual agents
may be averse to disclosing information to others for
competitive reasons or to ensure privacy. A load-serving
entity may not inform the ISO of the states of its loads,
e.g., the temperatures of every one of its large collection
of customer’s homes. A solar farm may not inform the ISO
of the extent of its cloud cover. More fundamentally, the
agents may not even be willing to share their individual
dynamic system models with each other. The ISO may
not be informed of the stochastic model of wind at a
wind farm, or the detailed model of the dynamics of a
coal plant. Similarly, agents may not share their individual
utility functions. A load-serving entity may not be willing
to disclose its contracts with its customers or its cost
of operations. Many of these entities compete with each
other and are sensitive to sharing their information with
competitors. Recently, privacy of loads has also emerged
as a major concern.1 Demand response can entail viola-
tion of privacy since it has been shown that having access
to a home’s real power consumption allows one to deduce
the number and behavior of its occupants [39].
Even if all agents were willing to share all their infor-
mation with the ISO, it would be such an intractably large
amount of information, amounting to a complete state of
the world, that the ISO would not be able to handle it
with acceptable complexity and delay anyway.
The ISO is nevertheless charged with maximizing the
sum of the utilities all the agents, i.e., the social welfare.
It plays the role of a mediator. It needs to determine how
much power each agent should generate/consume in each
time period over the time horizon of interest. It needs to
allocate the required power generation to the generators
over time in the most economical fashion. It also needs
to provide the optimal amount of power over time to
each load to optimize its utility. Demand and supply are
intertwined, since demand is uncertain and determined by
the cost of generation, while generation is also uncertain
and incentivized by the price that consumers are willing
to pay. All the agents are stochastic dynamic systems with
their own utility functions over time. The ISO needs to
do all this in the face of all the stochastic uncertainties
affecting the agents over the time horizon.
The ISO would like to achieve the above through eco-
nomic mechanisms, by determining prices, and by agents
responding with their own selfish utility maximizations as
in general equilibrium theory [3]. The complication is that
the agents are evolving stochastically in time. Therefore
the prices cannot simply be announced once and for
all at the beginning of the time interval of interest. For
example, a future high ambient temperature can lead to
very high demand that will need high prices to incentivize
extra generation or reduce deferrable demand. The prices
will need to vary stochastically in response to private
uncertainties affecting the agents. The price stochastic
process should carry all the information that is necessary
for all entities in the overall system to coordinate in a
globally optimal way, since each affects others.
The fundamental question examined in this paper is
whether and how this optimality can be attained given
stochastic dynamical system models for the agents, and
what form the mediation process or tatonnement [40]
takes. Our contribution is to show that there are iterative
interaction processes under which the ISO can indeed
perform this task. We address the complexity of this task
under several scenarios. The complexity is very high in
the general case. However, in the case where the agents
1Interestingly, privacy is nowhere mentioned in the seminal paper [9]
that introduced spot prices, indicative of how new issues arise.
5can be modeled as linear Gaussian stochastic systems
and the cost functions are quadratic, we show that a
much simpler scheme yields the systemwide global op-
timum. This scheme extends to encompass other linear
constraints, e.g., those modeling the electrical network,
thus providing a more comprehensive solution that takes
into consideration the power flows over the network.
Beyond balancing generation and consumption, there
are at least two additional problems that the ISO faces. It
needs to ensure no line’s capacity is exceeded in the elec-
trical transmission network, so as to prevent overheating.
This requires ensuring that in the solution of the power
flow equations at the obtained generations, the current
carried over every line does not exceed its capacity [19].
ISO’s also need to ensure reliability. If contingencies
occur, such as generator tripping or line-to-ground fault,
then the system’s electrical state should converge to an
acceptable equilibrium point [41]. ISO’s verify that the
solution has this property for all single event contingen-
cies, reformulating the problem if any violations are ob-
served. Considering multiple simultaneous contingencies
is computationally demanding and not the norm [42].
IV. SYSTEM MODEL AND ISO PROBLEM
We consider a smart grid consisting of M agents, each
of which may act as a producer, consumer or both, i.e., a
prosumer, evolving over a time interval t = 0, 1, . . . , T−1.
The time horizon T could be 96, which would correspond
to one day of 15 minute slots in the real-time market.
There is however considerable flexibility to model other
scenarios. One can model the risk-limited dispatch of
[38] where purchases of forward energy are made for
blocks of time, with blocks getting shorter as operations
approach real time. In that case the times t = 0, 1, . . . can
correspond to the 24 hour ahead, all the one-hour ahead,
and all the 15 minute ahead, times at which decisions
are made by agents. The states of the agents (below) can
keep track of their past purchases, temperature forecasts,
etc, so that noises can be regarded as changes to past
forecasts, allowing considerable generality.
Randomness is modeled through a probability space
(Ω,F ,P). The “state of the world” ω ∈ Ω captures a
multitude of random phenomena spread out temporally
and spatially, for example, unpredicted weather (the
wind-speed), unexpected events such as coal shortage,
or a damaged wind-turbine, etc.
Common and Private Uncertainties. The randomness
ω affects an agent i through the stochastic processes
Ni(ω, t) and Nc(ω, t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. Nc(t) is a “common”
uncertainty that affects and is known causally by all
agents, e.g., the weather of a city. Ni(t) is a “private”
uncertainty that is specific to agent i, and known causally
only to agent i. As we will see, this decomposition of
uncertainties clarifies the task of constructing interaction
schemes between the agents and ISO.
Agents are modeled as stochastic dynamical systems.
The state Xi(t) of agent i at t is known to it, and evolves
as Xi(t + 1) = fi(Xi(t), Ui(t), Ni(t), Nc(t), t), where
fi describes the dynamics of the agent i. The initial
condition Xi(0) can be random. The common case is that
Ui(t) is a scalar that denotes the amount of electricity
consumed (negative if supplied) from the grid by agent
i at time t, but we will allow Ui to be a vector of several
commodities being produced and consumed.
Consumption/Generation Constraints. Let
N ti := (Ni(0), Ni(1), . . . , Ni(t) denote the past of Ni,
and similarly define N tc . Agent i’s choice has to satisfy
the local capacity constraints Fi(N ti , N
t
c , t)Ui(t) ≤
gi(N
t
i , N
t
c , t)) +
∑t−1
s=0 Ci(N
t
i , N
t
c , s, t)Ui(s) and
hi(N
t
i , N
t
c , t, Ui(t)) ≤ 0 for each t. The affineness of
the former constraints in past Ui’s allows for ramping,
the dependence on t allows for seasonality, and the
dependence on Ni, Nc allows random effects on capacity.
Observations available to an agent i until time t include
the realizations of its system state Xi(s), common noise
Nc(s), and its private noise Ni(s) for 0 ≤ s ≤ t.
The One-step Cost Function of an agent i, 1 ≤ i ≤ M ,
denoted ci(xi, ui, t) (or its negative, a one-step utility
function −ci(xi, ui, t)), is a function of its state and
action, in period t. For producers, this could be the
cost of labor, coal, etc.. For consumers, this could
represent the cost incurred due to the high temperature
of house/business facility, or due to a delay in performing
a task resulting from inadequate purchase of electricity,
or the negative of some benefit of the electricity usage.
Externalities, e.g., pollution, with one-step cost∑M
i=1 ei(ui, t), say cost of mitigation, can be considered.
By allowing ei(ui, t) to be positive/negative ISO imposed
levies, cross-subsidies can be addressed. For linear levies,
eiui(t), ISO budget balance,
∑M
i=1 eiui(t) = 0, can be
enforced as shown below for energy balance.
Energy Balance should be maintained in each period, i.e.,∑M
i=1 Ui(t) = 0 for all t = 0, 1, . . . , T−1. We allow general
linear vector constraints:
∑M
i=1Ei(t)Ui(t) = d(t).
Total System Operating Cost, or its negative,
the Social Welfare, is the sum of the expected
value of the finite horizon total of the one-step
costs incurred by all the agents plus externalities,
E
∑T−1
t=0
∑M+1
i=1 [ci (Xi(t), Ui(t), t) + ei (Ui(t), t)]. It is
the total electricity generation cost plus the cost
of externalities minus the utility provided to the
consumers. The expectation above is taken with
respect to the combined uncertainty or “noise”
process N(t) := (Nc(t), N1(t), N2(t), . . . , NM (t)) for
t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1, consisting of all the private
uncertainties and the common uncertainties, as well
as the random initial conditions of all the M agents.
The Power Flow Equations are algebraic equations based
on Kirchoff’s laws that have to be satisfied by the electrical
variables, voltage and current magnitudes and phase
angles. They impose constraints on {Ui(t), 1 ≤ i ≤M}.
The Independent System Operator (ISO)’s task is
to maximize the social welfare. It solicits electricity
purchase/sale bids from the agents in each time slot
6t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1. Our model allows for agents and the
ISO to iterate on the bids. Once the price iterations have
converged, the ISO declares the market clearing prices,
and the electrical energy to be consumed/generated by
the agents, at the declared prices.
The Bidding Schemes allow the ISO and agents to
reach a solution for prices, generation and consumption.
Depending on the assumptions made about the system
model, there will be different bidding schemes. An
example is the following. Consider time s. The ISO
announces a price sequence for current and future
times, s ≤ t ≤ T − 1, to all agents. Agent i bids, as a
function of its past information, the amount of electricity
it is willing to purchase/generate at the current and
future times s ≤ t ≤ T − 1, at the prices indicated by
the ISO. After collecting the bids, the ISO updates the
price sequence. An iteration of price updates followed
by bid updates, continues till the prices and the bids
converge, and then the ISO announces the allocations
of generations/consumptions to agents for the current
period s. This entire process can be repeated in each
discrete time slot s in real-time.
Goal of Social Welfare Maximization: The goal is to
maximize the negative of total system cost, i.e., social
welfare. Let Ft be the σ-algebra generated by all the
noises upto time t, as well as initial conditions. Now we
come to the stringent goal of this paper. We would like
to attain the same maximum value of the social welfare as
could be attained over the class of all control laws where
U(t) := (U1(t), U2(t), . . . , UM (t)) is adapted to Ft.
This is an economically important point in that even
though the agents do not all act in a centralized way
and even though they do not all have access to all
the observations and initial conditions of each other, we
would like them to collectively attain the same optimal
value of social welfare by acting in a distributed way,
with each agent only using its own causal observations
together with the price information provided by the ISO.
In fact they do not even know each other’s dynamic
models or cost functions, taking this problem outside of
usual stochastic control/game theory.
The resulting ISO Problem is:
minE
T−1∑
t=0
M∑
i=1
[ci (Xi(t), Ui(t), t) + ei (Ui(t), t)] (1)
such that Xi(t+ 1) = fi(Xi(t), Ui(t), Ni(t), Nc(t), t);
with capacity constraints hi(N ti , N
t
c , t, Ui(t)) ≤ 0, (2)
Fi(N
t
i , N
t
c , t)Ui(t) ≤ gi(N ti , N tc , t)
+
t−1∑
s=0
Ci(N
t
i , N
t
c , s, t)Ui(s); (3)
M∑
i=1
Ei(t)Ui(t) = d(t) for 1 ≤ i ≤M, 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. (4)
The expectation above is taken with respect
to the combined uncertainty or “noise” process
N(t) := (Nc(t), N1(t), N2(t), . . . , NM (t), NM (t)) , t =
0, 1, . . . , T − 1, as well as the random initial conditions
(X1(0), X2(0), . . . , XM (0)). The actions Ui(t) are to be
taken on the basis of the past information available to
agent i at time t, which includes the past history of its
own observations of its system’s state, common noise and
private noise, as well as the common price information
provided to all agents by the ISO. The bidding process
to be studied below will determine the prices announced
by the ISO to all the agents.
The central issue is the following: How should the ISO
determine pricing and allocations to dynamic stochastic
agents so that the overall system is as optimal as it could
be through centralized control, even though agents do not
know each other’s dynamic models or cost functions?
A. Fundamental Challenges
The ISO Problem poses several challenges. It is a multi-
agent problem where stochastic dynamic agents with
differing objectives, ignorance of each other’s systems or
objectives, and separate observations, are constrained in
their joint actions; yet the goal is to ensure that they
function as a team and jointly maximize social welfare.
1) Constraint on joint actions: The problem cannot
be solved by considering each agent separately because
energy balance (4) constrains their joint actions.
2) Privacy constraints: The agents do not disclose their
system dynamics functions fi to other agents or the ISO.
In fact, the agents do not even know how many agents
are present.
3) Non-classical information structure: Even if all dy-
namics and probability distributions of uncertainties were
known to all, the ISO Problem would still lie at the core
of decentralized stochastic control with a non-classical
information structure [18], [21]–[24], [35], [43] since
each agent has separate observations from others. Even
if privacy were not an issue, sharing all observations
amongst all agents requires huge communication and pro-
cessing overhead, etc., and may be impossible in practice.
4) Conflicting objectives: The objectives of the agents
are not all aligned and may have conflicts.
5) Signaling: In decentralized stochastic control [22],
[24], [44], controllers may be able to signal some private
information to other agents over a “channel” which may
even be the physical plant itself. “Prices” can play the
role of a channel, with the bidding scheme functioning as
encoder-decoder. Essentially the ISO needs to construct a
“price” sufficient statistic for the problem [45], [46].
The question we address is: Can M independent systems
be driven to an overall optimal operation through the ISO?
We will show that there exist “iterative bidding schemes”
(IBS) which yield the same performance as that of the
optimal centralized controller.
V. STATIC DETERMINISTIC SYSTEMS
We begin with the problem where all generators and
consumers are static and deterministic. The ISO has to
allocate generations and consumptions so that the social
7welfare, the total benefit accrued from consumption mi-
nus the total cost of generation is maximized.
This can be formulated as a problem of minimizing
the total cost J(u) =
∑M
i=1[ci(ui) + ei(ui)] of M agents
and the externalities, where, if agent i is a generator
producing −ui (negative by convention for generation),
the cost of generation is ci(ui), while if it is a con-
sumer consuming ui the utility it obtains from consump-
tion is −ci(ui), and ei(ui) is the externality associated
with generation/consumption. Each generator/consumer
i may also be subject to linear/nonlinear vector inequality
constraints Fiui ≤ gi and hi(ui) ≤ 0. (When ui is a scalar,
this will reduce to either a semi-infinite interval or interval
constraint on ui under convexity of hi below).
This entails solving the following optimization problem:
min
u1,...,uM
M∑
i=1
[ci(ui) + ei(ui)], (5)
subject to: Fiui ≤ gi, hi(ui) ≤ 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤M, (6)
and
M∑
i=1
Eiui = d. (7)
Dualizing only the constraint (7), and denoting u :=
(u1, u2, . . . , uM ), yields, respectively, the Lagrangian, Dual
Function, and optimal reward of the Dual Problem:
L (u, λ) :=
M∑
i=1
[ci(ui) + +ei(ui) + λ
TEiui]− λT d,
D(λ) := min
{u:Fiui=gi,hi(ui)≤0 ∀i}
L (u, λ) ,
J? := max
λ
D(λ) = D(λ?). (8)
Assumption 1 (Assumption for deterministic case): (i)
ci(·), ei(·), hi(·) are convex, {ui : Fiui ≤ gi, hi(ui) ≤ 0} is
compact, and (5,6,7) has an optimal solution.
(ii) Slater’s Condition: There exists a feasible u¯i satisfying
hi(u¯i) < 0 in RelInt(Dom(ci)) ∩ RelInt(Dom(ei)).
From (ii), J? is also the optimal cost of the Primal (5).
Since D(λ) can be decomposed agent-by-agent as
D(λ) =
M∑
i=1
min
{ui: s.t. (6)}
[ci(ui) + ei(ui) + λ
TEiui]− λT d,
the ISO can conceivably simply announce the “optimal
price” λ? per unit of power as that which attains the max
in (8), and assess an additional levy ei(ui) on agent i.
(This levy could be a “carbon tax” used to mitigate the
pollution). Each agent i can then respond with either its
generation −u∗i or consumption u∗i that minimizes its net
“loss” ci(ui)+λ?ui over (6). The ISO can finally announce
the generation/consumption allocations to the agents.
There are two issues that arise:
(i) Since agents do not disclose their cost functions,
there needs to be a price discovery process, as in a
Walrasian auction [40]. The ISO’s price needs to be
reduced/increased according to whether the agents’ re-
sponse results in excess total generation/consumption).
We consider the following iterative price-bid process:
λk+1 = λk +
1
k
[
M∑
i=1
Eiu
k
i − d],
uk+1i =
argmin
{ui : s.t. (6)}[ci(ui) + ei(ui) + (λ
k+1)TEiui)].
This iteration of prices2 and bids is a subgradient algo-
rithm that converges to an optimal price for the Dual
under Assumption 1 [47].
(ii) The recovery of optimal generations/consumptions
from optimal price is more problematic:
Example 1 (Counterexample to generation/consumption recovery from optimal price):
Consider one generator and one load. The generator’s
cost of producing −u1 units of energy is − 25u1, with
u1 restricted to [−1, 0], and the cost of the externality
is − 110u1. The load’s utility from consuming u2 units of
energy is log(1 + u2) with u2 restricted to [0, 2], and it
has no externality. Energy should be balanced. The social
welfare problem is:
Min − 2
5
u1 − 1
10
u1 − log(1 + u2)
Subject to: − 1 ≤ u1 ≤ 0, 0 ≤ u2 ≤ 2, u1 + u2 = 0.
The optimal solution is (u?1, u
?
2) = (−1, 1).
The Dual function of price λ is
D(λ) = min
1≤u1≤0
[−1
2
u1 + λu1] + [− log(1 + u2)] + λu2].
The minimizers and minimum, (−u1(λ), u2(λ), D(λ)), are
=

(0,Min{ 1λ − 1, 2}, 1− λ+ log λ) if λ < 12 ,
(any point in [0, 1], 1λ − 1, 1− λ+ log λ) if λ = 12 ,
(1, 1λ − 1, 12 + log λ) if 12 < λ ≤ 1,
(1, 0,−λ+ 12 ) if 1 < λ,
The optimal solution of the Dual is λ? = 12 .
However, when the price λ? = 12 is announced by the
ISO, the generator can bid −u1 = 0 since any point in
[0,1] is optimal. The load’s bid is u2 = 1, and there will
not be balance between generation and consumption. 
Therefore one cannot recover the optimal bids from the
optimal prices. However, they can be recovered from the
iterations of the bidding process under Assumption 1 by
taking weighted averages of previous bids [48]. Thus the
very process of iterative bidding is itself important.
Theorem 1 (Determining optimal bids by generators and loads [48]):
Let θ ≥ 0. Consider the averaged bids obtained recursively
as follows:
u¯ki =
∑k−1
s=1 s
θ∑k
s=1 s
θ
u¯k−1i +
kθ∑k
s=1 s
θ
uki ; u¯
0
i = u
0
i (9)
Then u¯ki → u?i which is optimal for (5). 
A larger θ weights more recent values of the iterates for
ui more heavily, while θ = 0 takes a plain average.
2The gain 1
k
can be replaced by α
kδ
for 1
2
< δ ≤ 1 with α > 0 in
Sections V–IX.
8Example 2 (Continued): Choosing θ = 2, one obtains:
{λk} : 0, 0, 1, 0.6667, 0.5416, . . .→ 1
2
,
{uk} :
(−1
0
)
,
(
0
2
)
,
(−0.9412
0.1176
)
,
(−0.9898
0.4133
)
,(
0− 0.9972
0.7263
)
,
(−0.9990
0.9526
)
, . . .→
(−1
1
)
. 
VI. DYNAMIC DETERMINISTIC SYSTEMS
We consider the ISO Problem for deterministic systems:
min
T−1∑
t=0
M∑
i=1
[ci (xi(t), ui(t), t) + ei (ui(t), t)] (10)
s.t. xi(t+ 1) = fi(xi(t), ui(t), t), and (2,3,4). (11)
Since the state variables xi(t) can be expressed in terms
of the inputs ui := (ui(0), ui(1), . . . , ui(T − 1)), the ISO
problem can be written as (5). We assume Assumption 1.
The associated Lagrangian and dual function are
L (u, λ) :=
M∑
i=1
T−1∑
t=0
[ci(xi(t), ui(t), t) + ei(ui(t), t)
+ λ(t)TEi(t)ui(t)]−
T−1∑
t=0
λ(t)T d(t),
D(λ) := min
{u:u satisfies (2,3)(Ni,Nc absent) for 0≤t≤T−1,∀i}
L (u, λ) ,
(12)
where u := (u1, . . . , uM ), λ := (λ(0), . . . , λ(T − 1)), and
each xi(t) is regarded as a function of ui in (12). The
Lagrangian decomposes by agents. Therefore, given λ,
each agent i solves its own problem:
Min
T−1∑
t=0
[ci(xi(t), ui(t), t) + ei(ui(t), t) + λ(t)
TEi(t)ui(t)]
(13)
subject to (11).
The Bid-Price Iteration proceeds as follows. The ISO
announces prices λk = {λk(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1}.
Each agent i responds with an optimal solution uki :=(
uki (0), u
k
i (1), . . . , u
k
i (T − 1)
)
to (13). Since the subgra-
dient with respect to λ of the Dual function D(λ)
is
(∑M
i=1 ui(0),
∑M
i=1 ui(1), . . . ,
∑M
i=1 ui(T − 1)
)
, the ISO
employs the price iteration over k, for every t ∈ [0, T −1]:
λk+1(t) = λk(t) +
1
k
[
M∑
i=1
Ei(t)u
k
i (t)− d(t)]. (14)
The agent bids are averaged by (9) to give u¯ki (t). The ISO
announces the allocations u?i (t) := limk→∞ u¯
k
i (t).
Theorem 2: Consider the ISO problem (10,11) under
Assumption 1. Suppose the ISO employs the price it-
eration (14), with each agent i responding with an
optimal solution uki :=
(
uki (0), u
k
i (1), . . . , u
k
i (T − 1)
)
to
(13,11). Then the prices λk converge to the optimal
N1(3)=0 N1(3)=1 N1(3)=0 N1(3)=1 N1(3)=0 N1(3)=1 N1(3)=0 N1(3)=1
N2(2)=0 N2(2)=1 N2(2)=0 N2(2)=1
N1(1)=0 N1(1)=1
Initial State (x1,x2)
Fig. 1: A tree visualization of uncertainty for a two
agent system evolving over three bid times, where the
uncertainty values are binary, either 0 or 1.
prices λ? for (12). The ISO’s final allocation of genera-
tions/consumptions, u?, exists as a limit, and is optimal
for (10,11). If limk uki exists, averaging is not needed since
it is equal to u?. .
In this deterministic context, the whole problem
can be solved at time 0, with actions u? :=
(u?(0), u?(1), . . . , u?(T − 1)) implemented open loop.
VII. ITERATIVE BIDDING SCHEMES FOR STOCHASTIC
SYSTEMS
We now turn to the stochastic case. The goal is to solve
the ISO Problem (1) through Iterative Bidding Schemes
(IBS), as in Walrasian tatonnement [3]. We explain what
transpires in such an IBS for the simpler common un-
certainty context N(t) ≡ Nc(t). A tree visualization of
the system randomness, as in Fig. 1, is helpful. Suppose
that N(t) assumes only finitely many values. We can then
construct an uncertainty tree of depth T , in which the
root node corresponds to the initial system state, and the
sequence of transpired noises {N(0), N(1), . . . , N(s− 1)}
corresponds to some node at the level s.
Since all agents know the law of {Nc(t)}, i.e., the
probability measure induced on the sample paths of the
noise stochastic process {Nc(t)}, the agents know the
topology of the tree, and the transition probabilities along
edges. However, the agents do not know the system
dynamics of other agents, their utility functions, or states
or actions. The ISO need not know the law of N . We will
suppose that the ISO does know the topology of the tree
and the labels of the nodes.
Let Fi,t := σ(Xi(0), Ni(0), Ni(1), . . . , Ni(t −
1), Nc(0), Nc(1), . . . , Nc(t − 1)) denote the sigma-
algebra generated by agent i’s observations up to time
t. (Incorporating Ni(·) is unnecessary since private
uncertainties are absent here, but will be useful
subsequently in the general case of private observations).
The IBS scheme will intertwine two processes, a
Bid Update Process and a Price Update Process. As in
Section V, information revealed during the bidding
process is important to determining the final allocation.
Additionally, repeating the process at each time instant
is important in the stochastic dynamic case in adapting
to how agents are evolving over time as uncertain events
happen.
Bid Update Stochastic Process
Bs = (Ui,s(s),Ui,s(s+ 1), . . . ,Ui,s(T− 1)): The bid
9update stochastic process Bs at the particular time s of an
agent i specifies how much electricity that agent intends
to purchase (negative if supplying) in every time period
from that time s till the final time T − 1 in response
to future events. As above, for illustratory purposes,
we assume that N(·) is observed causally by all agents.
Then, this bid function of agent i is a function which
specifies to the ISO, at any time s, as a function of the
past history of observed noise N(τ), τ < s, how much
electricity it will purchase at each instant in the future
under different future uncertainties. In Fig. 1, the bid
function of agent i specifies, for each node in the tree,
the amount of electricity that it is willing to purchase if
and when the system passes through that node.
The Price Update Stochastic Process
λs = (λs(s), λs(s+ 1), . . . , λs(T− 1)) is a stochastic
process announced by the ISO at time s. Assuming that
the noise process N(·) is observed causally by all the
agents, it specifies for each time s ≤ t ≤ T − 1, as a
function of the past history of observed noise N(τ), τ < s,
the price λs(t) at which electricity will be sold in the
market at time t under different future uncertainties. In
the tree of Fig. 1, it corresponds to a price corresponding
to each node of the tree at levels s through T − 1.
k-th Bid Update at time t: Suppose that the ISO has
declared a price process λks at time s, where k is an
index that we will use for iteration. In the Bid Update,
each agent i changes its bid Bks in response to the price
function λks by solving the following problem, dubbed
Agent i’s Problem,
min
Ui s.t. (2,3)
E[
T−1∑
t=s
[ci(Xi(t), Ui(t), t) + ei(Ui(t), t)
+ λks(t)
TEi(t)Ui(t)]|Fi,s]. (15)
(k+ 1)-th Price Update at time s: The ISO updates
the price process in response to the agents’ bids. Guided
by the “excess consumption function”
∑M
i=1Ei(t)U
k
i,s(t)−
d(t), it raises or lowers prices to satisfy the general linear
constraint:
λk+1s (t) = λ
k
s(t)+
1
k
[
M∑
i=1
Ei(t)U
k
i,s(t)−d(t)], s ≤ t ≤ T−1.
(16)
The Final Averaged Allocations. At time s, after the
prices have converged, i.e., λ?s(t) = limk→∞ λ
k
s(t) for
s ≤ t ≤ T − 1, the ISO announces the allocations as the
limits U?i,s(t) := limk→∞ U¯
k
i,s(t) for s ≤ t ≤ T − 1, of the
following averaged bids,
U¯ki,s(t) =
∑k−1
s=1 s
θ∑k
s=1 s
θ
U¯k−1i,s (t) +
kθ∑k
s=1 s
θ
Uki,s(t), (17)
with U¯0i,s(t) = U
0
i,s(t). If the unaveraged agent bids
converge, then their limit is the same as the above. As
in Section V, under appropriate conditions the limits of
the prices and the averaged bids do exist.
VIII. STOCHASTIC SYSTEMS WITH COMMON
UNCERTAINTIES: STATE PRICES AND BIDDING
Now we analyze how the above Iterative Bidding
Scheme functions in the case of common uncertainties,
i.e., N(t) ≡ Nc(t), and there are no private noises Ni.
Denote the combined state of the system by X(t) :=
(X1(t), X2(t), . . . , XM (t)), and the combined actions by
U(t) := (U1(t), U2(t), . . . , UM (t)).
At each time s, a sequence of iterative tentative price
announcements by the ISO for each node at or below the
current node at level s, followed by tentative bids by all
agents for such nodes responding optimally to the price
announcement, takes place, until they converge. At each
iteration, the ISO revises the tentative price announce-
ment to drive the “excess consumption” at each node
towards zero, and agents respond optimally according to
their own cost-to-go function. This iteration of tentative
prices and tentative bids continues till the prices converge.
At that point the agents consume/generate the weighted
average amount they bid for the particular node occupied
at time s. The system then moves forward to time s+ 1,
arriving at a random node at level s + 1 according to
N(s), and the entire process is repeated. This is in the
same fashion as Model Predictive Control.
This process is a dynamic modification of Arrow’s [3]
approach of treating each “good” available at a certain
time and place as a separate good. Since agents do not
know each other’s dynamics or states or actions there
is the added critical proviso of bidding for future “time-
places” by each agent, with only the current price being
actually implemented a la Model Predictive Control.
Assumption 2 (Assumption for stochastic case): (i)
There is an optimal solution of (1) with finite cost.
(ii)
∑T−1
t=0 ci(Xi(t), Ui(t), t),
∑T−1
t=0 ei(Ui(t), t), and
hi(N
t
i , N
t
c , t, Ui(t)) are convex in U
T−1
i for each noise
sequence NT−1, with Xi(t) a function of U t−1i and N
t.
(iii) For each fixed noise sequence N tc , N
t
i , there
exists a feasible u¯ satisfying hi(, t, u¯i(t)) < 0 in
RelInt(Dom(ci)) ∩ RelInt(Dom(ei)) for for 1 ≤ i ≤
M, 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. For simplicity of exposition we suppose
that the noise processes Nc(t), Ni(t) assume only finitely
many values, allowing them to be represented by a tree
as in Fig. 1.
Theorem 3: In the above common uncertainty case,
the price-bid solution, with price updates (16), and bid
updates determined as the optimal solution of (15), and
allocations at each t given by limk→∞ U¯k where U¯k is
obtained as the averaged version of Uk as in (9), achieves
the maximum social welfare when the cost functions
satisfy Assumption 2.
Proof: Let us suppose that x(0) is fixed, without loss
of generality. Let pv denote the probability of node v
in the uncertainty tree. The depth of the node in the
tree indicates time. Now, a Markov policy [49] maps
the system state and time to actions, thereby specifying
an action U(v) := (U0(v), U1(v), . . . , UM (v)) satisfying∑M
i=1Ei(v)Ui(v) = d(v) for every node v in the tree.
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This is easily seen to be true by noting that each node in
the uncertainty tree also indicates the state of the system
at that time. Now let us consider a more general “tree
policy” that specifies a U(v) := (U0(v), U1(v), . . . , UM (v))
satisfying
∑M
i=1Ei(v)Ui(v) = d(v) for every node v in the
tree. The class of tree policies is more general than the
class of Markov policies, since two nodes in the tree at
the same depth may correspond to the same state X(t)
arrived at through differing noise realizations, but a tree
policy can choose different actions for them. Since the
class of Markov policies contains an optimal policy, it
follows that the class of tree policies also contains one.
For every tree policy, for every node v, there is a unique
sequence of actions Uv := {U(0), . . . , U(t)} taken in the
preceding t steps, where t denotes depth of node v. The
state X(t) corresponding to v is thereby determined by
(v, Uv). The problem (1) can be written equivalently as
the following optimization problem,
Min
M∑
i=1
∑
v
pv[ci (v, U
v) + ei (U
v)]
Fi(v)Ui(v) ≤ gi(v) +
∑
{v′:v′ a predecessor of v}
Ci(v
′, v)Ui(v′),
(18)
hi(Ui(v), v) ≤ 0, (19)
such that
M∑
i=1
Ei(v)Ui(v) = d(v),∀v.
Under Assumption 2, the convex programming problem
has no duality gap. Let λ(v) be the Lagrange multiplier
for the constraint
∑M
i=1Ei(v)Ui(v) = d(v), and define the
vector λ := {λ(v)}. We obtain,
L (U, λ) :=
M∑
i=1
∑
v
pv[
∑
v
ci(v, u
v) + ei(u
v)+
λ(v)TEi(v)Ui(v)]−
∑
v
pvλ(v)
T d(v).
The process λ(v) will be called the “price process”. Each
agent submits a bid for each possible future realization
v of the noise process, while the ISO specifies a price at
each v. The proof parallels the deterministic one. 
IX. STOCHASTIC SYSTEMS WITH PRIVATE UNCERTAINTIES
Now we address the general case where agents have
private uncertainties in addition to common uncertainty,
i.e., N(t) = (Nc(t), N1(t), N2(t), . . . , NM (t)), where Nc is
a common uncertainty that is observed by all, but each Ni
is only observed by agent i. We will suppose that all the
agents know the law of {N(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1}, but that
the ISO knows only the labels of the noise. The agents
do not know the dynamics or the cost/utility functions or
states of the other agents.
The same Price-Bid iteration can be used, as detailed
in Algorithm 1, and the same result carries over.
Theorem 4: For the above system featuring private un-
certainties as well as common uncertainties, the bidding
process with ISO updating prices according to (16),
each agent i updating its consumption/generation bid
according to the optimal solution of (15), and allocations
determined at each t by the averaging as in (9), achieves
the optimal social welfare under Assumption 2.
Proof: At time 0, there are no private noises Ni(−1), and
so the above proof holds at time 0. Noting this, it follows
that the result also holds at each time s ≥ 1 since the
bid-price iteration is repeated at each such time, and we
can simply regard s as the new “initial” time. 
Algorithm 1 : Stochastic Dynamic Agents
Assumption: The law of the combined noise process
L(N) is common knowledge of all agents and labels
are known to the ISO.
for bidding times s = 0 to T − 1 do
k = 0
repeat
Each agent i solves the problem
Min E
T−1∑
t=s
[ci(Xi(t), Ui(t), t) + ei(Ui(t), t)
+ λk(t)TEi(t)Ui(t)],
with initial condition Xi(s) to obtain the optimal
{Uki,s(t), s ≤ t ≤ T − 1} subject to (18,19), and
submits it to ISO.
The ISO declares new prices for s ≤ t ≤ T −1, i.e.,
λk+1(t) = λk(t) +
1
k
[
M∑
i=1
Ei(t)U
k
i (t)− d(t)].
k → k + 1
until λk(t) converges a.s. to λ?(t) for s ≤ t ≤ T − 1.
ISO computes U¯ki,s(s) as in (17), and implements
U?i,s(s) := limk→∞ U¯
k
i,s(s).
end for
The assumption that the law of L(N(t)) is common
knowledge can potentially be relaxed by utilizing Stochas-
tic Approximation [50]–[52], so that agents can “learn”
them as the system evolves.
The major drawback of this algorithm is that it is
exponentially complex in T due to the number of states in
the tree, even if each N(t) is binary. In the next section
we show that we can dramatically simplify the bidding
process and solution in the LQG context.
X. THE ISO PROBLEM FOR LQG AGENTS
We will now show that in the LQG case one can meet
both the stringent privacy and lack of knowledge con-
straints of other agents, and yet avoid the complexity of
the solution in the general case where stochastic process
bids need to be made for all future uncertainties. Only
iterations between vectors of future prices announced by
the ISO, and vectors of future consumption/generation bids
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Start with s = 0
ISO declares prices λ0(t) for times s ≤ t ≤ T − 1, sets k = 0
Each Agent i optimizes consump-
tion/generation for s ≤ t ≤ T − 1
for the deterministic model xi(t + 1) =
Aixi(t) + Biu
k
i (t), xi(s) = Xi(s),
with cost
∑T−1
t=s [x
ᵀ
i (t)Qixi(t) +
ui(
kt)ᵀRiuki (t) + λ
k(t)uki (t)]
Agents submit bids uki (t) for s ≤ t ≤ T − 1
Bids converged?
Update
Prices
λk+1(t) =
λk(t) +
αk
∑
i u
k
i (t)
for s ≤
t ≤ T − 1
Implement the first entry of the converged
bids as Ui(s). Agents update states
Xi(s + 1) = AiXi(s) + BiUi(s) +
Ni(s). Increment time s by one
Is s = T?
Stop
yes
yes
no
no
Fig. 2: Scheme for ISO Problem with LQG Agents.
by the agents are needed, similar to deterministic dynamic
systems. Moreover, agents need not know the laws of the
private uncertainties of other agents or anything at all
about each other. In fact they do not even need to know of
the existence of the others. Yet, optimal coordination can
be achieved by the ISO, and that too in a tractable manner
where agents bid at each time. This appears practically
feasible with bid periods separated by minutes.
The only difference between the deterministic dynamic
case treated in Section VI and the LQG case is that while in
the former the bid-price iteration only needs to be carried
out at time 0, in the LQG case it needs to be carried out at
each time s. This is similar to Model Predictive Control,
where we only implement the first step of the prices and
consumptions/generations at each time s.
The M agents have linear dynamics affected by Gaus-
sian noise and have quadratic costs. Externalities con-
stituting a positive semidefinite quadratic plus a linear
term in Ui could be included, but are omitted below
for simplicity. Initial conditions and noises are Gaussian:
Xi(0) ∼ N(0,Σi,0) and Ni(t) ∼ N(0, Pi,t), and inde-
pendent of all others. The cost functions of agents, are
quadratic, with Qi ≥ 0 and Ri > 0. The ISO Problem is:
Min E
T−1∑
t=0
M∑
i=1
[Xᵀi (t)QiXi(t) + U
ᵀ
i (t)RiUi(t)] (20)
Xi(t+ 1) = AiXi(t) +BiUi(t) +Ni(t), and (4). (21)
The case of time-varying systems is entirely analogous.
Agents have no knowledge of each other’s presence.
Agent i does not know the value of M , the number
of agents, the matrices {Aj , Bj , Qj , Rj ,Σj,0, Pj,·)}j 6=i of
other agents, the realizations of their state processes
{Xj(·), j 6= i} or noises {Nj(·), j 6= i}.
We propose and prove the convergence and optimality
of an Iterative Bidding Scheme which is much simpler
than that of Section VIII in the following critical aspect.
The bid function submitted at time s specifying the
quantity of electricity that agent i is willing to purchase
at times {s, s + 1, . . . , T − 1} is not a function of the
outcomes of the noise sequence {N(t), t > s}. It is simply
a vector (ui(s), ui(s + 1), . . . , ui(T − 1)) comprised of
T − s + 1 entries. The same is also true for prices. The
ISO just specifies a vector (λ(s), λ(s+ 1), . . . , λ(T − 1)) of
T −s entries. Both are not specified as functions of future
uncertainties.
This makes it different from Arrow [3]. The complexity
of specifying prices or bids for all future events is avoided.
Removal of future event-based bidding and prices leads
to a drastic reduction in the complexity of the iterative
scheme that arises even if all uncertainties were finite
valued, let alone real valued as here.
Another simplifying feature is that the ISO need not
average the bids as in the (9). The bids of agents converge
at each time instant without averaging.
Note that even though the bid function at each time
s is not future event-based, it is determined afresh
at each time. At each time s, the following iteration
takes place: Each agent bids a vector of future genera-
tions/consumptions in response to prices announced by
the ISO for future power, and the ISO updates the prices
in return, until convergence. Hence, the converged prices
and consumptions/generations do depend on the system
states of the M agents, and are therefore stochastic.
The key to showing the existence of such a simple
bidding scheme lies in utilizing the certainty equivalence
property of LQG systems [49].
Algorithm 2 : ISO Problem with LQG Agents
for bidding times s = 0 to T − 1 do
k = 0
Initialize {λks(t) : s ≤ t ≤ T − 1} arbitrarily.
repeat
Each agent i solves the problem (22) for a deter-
ministic system (23) with initial condition xi(s) :=
Xi(s), where Xi(s) is the state of the i-th agent
at time s, and submits the optimal values, denoted
uki,s(t), for s ≤ t ≤ T − 1 to the ISO.
ISO updates the prices according to (25,26).
Increment k by 1.
until uki,s(t) converges to u
?
i,s(t),
Implement (u?1,s(s), u
?
2,s(s), . . . , u
?
M,s(s))
end for
The iterative bidding scheme is shown in Fig. 2 and
Algorithm 2. For simplicity, consider only balance of
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energy. At time s, in response to the (k − 1)-th iterate
announced by the ISO of the price sequence (λks(s), λ
k
s(s+
1), . . . , λks(T )), agent i announces the optimal open loop se-
quence (uki,s(s), u
k
i,s(s+1), . . . , u
k
i,s(T−1)) for the following
deterministic Linear Quadratic Regulator (LQR) problem:
min
T−1∑
t=s
[xᵀi (t)Qixi(t) + ui(t)
ᵀRiui(t) + λks(t)ui(t)] (22)
s.t. xi(t+ 1) = Aixi(t) +Biui(t), s ≤ t ≤ T − 1, (23)
with initial condition xi(s) := Xi(s). (24)
The price adjustment now is just for a vector of real
numbers at each time s:
λk+1s (t) = λ
k
s(t) + α
k
M∑
i=1
uki,s(t), s ≤ t ≤ T − 1. (25)
where αk > 0, lim
k
αk = 0,
∞∑
k=0
αk = +∞. (26)
At time s, the iterations in k are continued till the price
iterations (λks(s), λ
k
s(s + 1), . . . , λ
k
s(T − 1)) converge to
(λ?s(s), λ
?
s(s+1), . . . , λ
?
s(T−1)). Denote the corresponding
limit of the input sequence of agent i by (u?i,s(s), u
?
i,s(s+
1), . . . , u?i,s(T −1)). The price at time s is then set to λ?s(s)
and each agent i applies the input u?i,s(s). This is repeated
at time s+ 1.
Theorem 5: The bid-price iteration scheme
(22,23,24,25,26) achieves the optimal social welfare for
the LQG ISO Problem (20,21,4).
Proof: Let
x := (x1, x2, . . . , xM ), u := (u1, u2, . . . , uM ),
A := diag(A1, A2, . . . , AM ), B := diag(B1, B2, . . . , BM ),
Q = diag(Q1, Q2, . . . , QM ), R = diag(R1, R2, . . . , RM ),
and consider the following deterministic constrained LQR
problem, with no noise, and featuring energy balance:
min
T∑
t=0
[xᵀ(t)Qx(t) + uᵀ(t)Ru(t)] (27)
with x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +Bu(t), and (4). (28)
Since the state is affine in u, after substituting for
the states, we have a positive definite quadratic pro-
gramming problem with equality constraints. The Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker matrix is nonsingular (Section 10.1 of [53])
since Ri > 0, and so there are unique u?, λ? optimal
for the primal and dual, respectively The Dual function
is a differentiable concave quadratic function, and the
subgradient method is actually a gradient method that
converges under non-summability of step-sizes, without
even requiring square summability (Section 2.5 of [54]).
The bids uki are affine functions of the prices λ
k. Since
prices satisfy balancing, so does their limit. Hence this
deterministic problem can be solved by the Bid-Price
iteration (13,14) between the agents and the ISO, as
shown for the deterministic problem in Section V, to
obtain the optimal inputs u(t) for 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1.
However, at the particular time s = 0 with xi(0) =
Xi(0), the Bid-Price Iteration (22,23,24) and (25) corre-
sponds exactly to the same Bid-Price Iteration (13,11) and
(14) as in Section V. Hence the end result of Algorithm
2 at time s = 0 is the optimal action for (27,28),
u(0) = (u1(0), u2(0), . . . , uM (0)). (29)
Now note that due to energy balance, no matter
how the first (M − 1) agents choose their consump-
tions/generations, agent M ’s choice is forced to be
uM (t) = −
M−1∑
i=0
ui(t) for all t, (30)
due to the energy balance constraint. Hence one can
substitute for uM (t) and obtain an equivalent standard,
i.e., unconstrained, deterministic LQR problem featuring
only (M − 1) inputs ureduced := (u1, u2, . . . , uM−1), where
there is no energy balance constraint:
min
T∑
t=0
[xᵀ(t)Qx(t) + uᵀreduced(t)Rreducedureduced(t)] (31)
subject to x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +Breducedu(t), (32)
the deterministic reduced unconstrained LQR problem.
For this problem (31,32), which is just a standard
LQR Problem, the optimal solution is given by linear
feedback ureduced(0) = Γreduced(0)x(0), where Γreduced(·) is
the optimal feedback gain.
Noting that uM is linear in ureduced, we deduce that for
the full system (27,28) with all M agents, the optimal
solution for the deterministic constrained LQR problem
with the energy balance constraint, is u(0) = Γ(0)x(0),
where Γ(·) is the optimal feedback gain obtained from
Γreduced through (30).
Now consider the corresponding reduced unconstrained
stochastic LQG problem where there is white Gaussian
noise in the state equations (28):
minE
T∑
t=0
[Xᵀ(t)QX(t) + Uᵀreduced(t)RreducedUreduced(t)]
(33)
with X(t+ 1) = AX(t) +BreducedUreduced(t) +N(t).
(34)
By Certainty Equivalence [49], the same linear feedback
gain as in the deterministic reduced LQR problem is also
optimal. In particular, in state X(0) = x(0) at time 0,
U(0) = Γ(0)x(0) continues to be optimal. Thus u(0) given
by (29) is optimal for (33,34).
However, reduced unconstrained stochastic LQG prob-
lem (33,34) is equivalent to unreduced constrained LQG
problem (20,21,4), and so the same U(0) is optimal.
Thus the Bid-Price iteration scheme determines the
optimal actions for the agents at time 0. Our scheme
(22,23,24) for the LQG problem repeats such a Bid-Price
scheme iteration at each time s = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1. Each
X(s) can be regarded as an initial state for a subsequent
system re-started at time s, and the above argument
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shows that the actions U(s) that it results in for the agents
at all times s are also optimal, completing the proof. 
This result extends to LQG systems where each agent i
only has noisy observations Yi(t) = DiXi(t)+Vi(t), where
Vi are independent and Gaussian.
XI. INCORPORATING ADDITIONAL LINEAR CONSTRAINTS:
THE DC OPTIMAL POWER FLOW
Besides energy balance, there are additional constraints
of interest. An important one is ensuring that the power
flows are delivered over the network. These constraints
are captured by the AC Power Flow Equations [19], an
approximation of which leads to the so-called DC Power
Flow equations that are linear constraints [19]. The bid-
price iterations can be extended to encompass any such
additional linear constraints. The only difference is that
there are several prices, one for each constraint, that each
agent needs to incorporate in choosing its actions.
Theorem 6: Consider a system consisting of M agents,
where each Agent i’s system is a Linear Gaussian System:
Xi(t+ 1) = AiXi(t) +BiUi(t) +Ni(t).
Agent i has a quadratic cost (negative utility):
minE
(
T−1∑
t=0
[Xᵀi (t)QiXi(t) + U
ᵀ
i (t)RiUi(t)]
)
.
There are N linear constraints that need to be satisfied:
M∑
i=1
γi,nUi(t) = 0 for 1 ≤ n ≤ N, t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1.
Neither ISO nor agents know the number M or the
dynamics/costs/law/states/noises of other agents.
Consider the following Bid-Multiple Price Iteration. At
each time s = 0, 1, . . . , T−1, at each iterate k, in response
to prices {λkn,s(t) : s ≤ t ≤ T − 1}, announced by the ISO,
agent i solves the deterministic LQR problem:
min
T−1∑
t=s
[xᵀi (t)Qixi(t) + ui(t)
ᵀRiui(t) +
N∑
n=1
λkn,s(t)ui(t)],
with xi(s) = Xi(s), determines the optimal {uks(t) : s ≤
t ≤ T − 1}, and communicates this sequence to the ISO.
Upon receiving the bids at iterate k from all the agents at
time s, the ISO updates the N price sequences:
λk+1n,s (t) = λ
k
n,s(t) + α
k
(
M∑
i=1
γi,nu
k
i,s(t)
)
,
for 1 ≤ n ≤ N and s ≤ t ≤ T − 1, with the step-sizes
satisfying (26). The multiple iterations converge, and let
{λ?n,s(t) : s ≤ t ≤ T−1} denote the limit. Correspondingly
let {u?s(t) : s ≤ t ≤ T −1} denote the limits of the bids by
the agents. At each time s, agent i applies Ui(s) = u?s(s).
Then this Bid-Multiple Price Iteration yields the maximum
social welfare under the multiple constraints.
Proof: The proof parallel the single constraint case. 
In the case of the DC Power Flow constraints, this yields
the optimal stochastic dynamic location marginal prices
[10] that simultaneously take into account all the factors
of location, dynamics and stochasticity.
XII. SIMULATION EXAMPLES
In the following, we use the space conditioning example
from [55] for thermal inertial load agents. Let S1, S2, S3
be sets of conditioning facilities (loads), conventional
generators, and renewable suppliers, respectively, and let
i ∈ S1, j ∈ S2, k ∈ S3. The dynamics of the temperature
Xi(t) of the i-th facility is given by (35), where XO(t)
= the outside temperature at time t,  = e−τ/TC =
“factor of inertia”, TC = 2.5 hours = time-constant of
the system, τ = time duration between control epochs,
which is the same as the inter-bid duration, η = 2.5
= thermal conversion efficiency, and A = 0.14kW/◦F
= overall thermal conductivity. With Xdi (t) the desired
facility temperature, the cost incurred is a quadratic in the
temperature deviation. For fossil-fuel generators, the unit-
time conventional generation cost curves [56] for supply-
ing energy are quadratic in generation Uj . We replace
hard constraints on ramp-rates |Uj(t) − Uj(t − 1)| by a
quadratic penalty, with C3 below chosen so that the hard
bounds are met, with state given by (36). For a renewable
energy facility k, Bk denotes its buffer capacity, Wk(t)
stochastic wind/solar energy, and Xk(t) the renewable
energy level satisfying (37). Its operating cost is constant.
The resulting ISO Problem (1) is
minE
{∑
i∈S1
T−1∑
t=0
(
Xi(t)−Xdi (t)
)2
+
∑
j∈S2
(
Cj,1Uj(t) + Cj,2U
2
j (t) + Cj,3 (Uj(t)−Xj(t))2
)
such that
M∑
`∈S1∪S2∪S3
U`(t) = 0, for t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1,
Xi(t+ 1) = Xi(t) + (1− )
(
XOi (t) +
η
A
Ui(t)
)
, (35)
Xj(t+ 1) = Uj(t), (36)
Xk(t+ 1) = Min{Xk(t)− Uk(t) +Wk(t), Bk}. (37)
We will compare the performance of the proposed
Stochastic Dynamic Optimal Bid-Price Iteration scheme
of Sections IX or X, called ”Optimal” below, with the
currently followed Static Dispatch scheme of Section V
used in dynamic situations as explained in Section I,
under which the agents perform separate and uncoupled
bid-price iterations at each time t to optimize the static
cost C(X(t), U(t)) incurred at that time t.
Bidding with LQG Systems: A day is divided into twelve
τ = 2 hour bid-slots, so  = 0.4493. There are only
thermal loads, and wind-farms which have a cost function
1
2X
2(t) and with infinite storage capacity B. Outside
temperatures and available wind power are modeled
as i.i.d. and normal. (This is only a first step towards
modeling the uncertainty, and other types of distributions
can potentially be similarly explored). Variance of wind
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energy is 1 unit for all t. The scenario is described in
Table I. At the beginning of day, the thermal loads have
temperature of 70◦F , while wind-farms have 100 units of
energy. The price vector is projected at each update onto
a large compact set, and, at termination, the bid vector is
projected onto the hyperplane
∑
i Ui = 0.
Figs. 3-5 compare performance of the two schemes as
the number of bid-price updates, the number of agents
connected to the grid, and variance of wind energy pro-
cess, are varied. Figs. 6 and 7 show how the Optimal
scheme is able to attain better social welfare for scale 2.
55 60 65 70 75 80 70 60 50 50 50 50
80 80 80 80 60 60 60 60 80 80 80 80
30 40 0 70 70 70 70 0 0 0 0 0Wind Power 
Outside Temp. 
Desired Temp. 
TABLE I: Mean outside and desired thermal load temper-
atures (in ◦F ), and mean wind power for the 12 periods.
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Number of Bid-Price Updates per bid instant
0.8
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1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
Co
st
×105
Optimal Dispatch
Static Dispatch
Fig. 3: Cost, i.e., negative social welfare, vs. number
of Bid-Price iterations with five thermal loads and two
windfarms.
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Fig. 4: Cost as number of users is scaled linearly by i, with
ratio of thermal loads to windfarms held constant at 5/2,
and with = 15 + 5i bid-price iterations at each time t.
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Fig. 5: Cost vs. wind variance with five thermal loads and
two windfarms, with 30 Bid-Price iterations.
Bidding in Tree Scenario: The time-horizon is 2 and time
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Fig. 6: Power generation: Optimal scheme “predicts” the
incumbent energy shortage in advance, thereby eliciting
smoother generator response. The power production costs
for the two schemes are, respectively, 4.37, 28.06 (×104),
while thermal loads disutility are 13.15, 9.62 (×104).
Adding these two costs, the net costs are 1.75, 3.76 (×105),
so that savings achieved by Optimal Scheme is 53.5%.
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Fig. 7: Prices: Optimal scheme “declares” the energy
shortage/surplus well in advance, allowing users to react
appropriately and eliciting demand response.
duration between two bids is 5 hours, roughly coinciding
with morning (7 am)/12 noon, giving  = 0.1353. Table II
lists stochasticity parameters of wind for two scenarios.
For fossil plants, C1 = 0.1, C2 = 0.01, C3 = 0.1. Wind-
farms incur no operational cost. Bid/price vectors at t = 0
have three entries, while they are scalar at time t = 1.
TO(1),TO(2) Td(1),Td(2) W1,W2 P1,P2 S1/S2/S3 B
Case 1 30,40 (in ◦F) 60,80 5,0 0.5,0.5 7/1/1 30
Case 2 40,60 60,90 10,0 0.95,0.05 4/1/1 40
TABLE II: The only stochasticity is wind availability at time
1, with possible realizations W1,W2 with respective prob-
abilities P1, P2. |S1|/|S2|/|S3| are the relative numbers of
thermal loads, fossil plants and windmills.
Figures 8-10 compare the costs averaged over multiple
wind realizations of the two policies under various sce-
narios, for the two schemes. Thermal loads are allowed
to become energy producers, while wind-farm operators
are allowed to store energy in case there is excess energy
supply in the market, showcasing how potential prosumer
behavior in energy market. The particular prices and
power generations for Scenario 1, are shown in Table III.
XIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The problem of maximizing the social welfare of a
collection of dynamic stochastic agents is more complex
15
4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
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Fig. 8: Performance as a function of number of Bid-Price
updates for the two scenarios in Table II.
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Fig. 9: Cost as number of agents is increased linearly with
scale, in the ratio S1/S2/S3 shown in Table II.
than stochastic control since agents do not know the
dynamical equations or utility functions of others. It is
further complicated by its dynamic, stochastic, decentral-
ized nature, since each agent’s optimal choices depend on
the probability distributions of future prices, which are
affected by the unknown states and actions of all agents.
Yet agents have to make decisions in real-time, as does the
ISO since it needs to set prices before agents can decide.
We have exhibited iterative bidding schemes that attain
the optimal performance of a centralized control policy
that is aware of the dynamics, utilities, uncertainties
and states of all agents, under appropriate compactness-
convexity or LQG assumptions. It yields the optimal
stochastic dynamic locational marginal prices.
The ISO critically exploits the sequential information
obtained during the iterative price-bid process to deter-
mine the optimal prices and generation/consumption al-
locations. This is the stochastic dynamic analog of bidding
demand/supply curves in simple static settings, whence
the ISO can simply intersect cumulative demand and
production curves to determine the optimal price.
The social-welfare optimality can potentially result in
significant economic benefits in energy markets. The re-
sults may be of interest to general equilibrium theory.
While the agents are all presumed to be “price takers,”
the scheme can be expected to have some strategic robust-
ness under some monotonicity assumptions. For example,
in the static deterministic case, agents do not benefit
from overbidding/underbidding which drives the price
up/down, leading to net losses for the agent in either case.
Examining this in a broader context, while shortening the
bid iteration process, is an important issue.
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
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Fig. 10: Cost as wind availability at t = 1, and storage
buffer at windfarms are increased. Buffer capacity in
i-th simulation is 10i, while wind energy W (1) is i.
Temperature conditions and agents are as in Table II.
λ(1) λ(2) Power	for	t=1 Power	for	t=2 Net	Operation	Cost %	Savings
7.6421 6.6159 69.0021 142.2757 878.2477 25.59
30 40 86.5085 116.4229 11803 -Static
Optimal
TABLE III: Prices, power generation and cost savings.
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